The NORA rapid risk assessment tool was developed for situations where there is a change in the disease status of easily transmissible animal diseases in neighbouring countries or in countries with significant interactions with Finland. The goal was to develop a tool that is quick to use and will provide consistent results to support risk management decisions. The model contains 63 questions that define the potential for entry and exposure by nine different pathways. The magnitude of the consequences is defined by 23 statements. The weight of different pathways is defined according to the properties of the assessed disease. The model was built as an Excel spreadsheet and is intended for use by animal health control administrators. As an outcome, the model gives the possible pathways of disease entry into the country, an overall approximation for the probability of entry and the subsequent exposure, an overall estimate for the consequences and a combined overall risk estimate (probability multiplied by magnitude of consequences). Model validity was assessed by expert panels. Outside Africa, African swine fever is currently established in Russia and Sardinia. In addition, there have been cases in both wild boar and domestic pigs in
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The NORA rapid risk assessment tool was developed for situations where there is a change in the disease status of easily transmissible animal diseases in neighbouring countries or in countries with significant interactions with Finland. The goal was to develop a tool that is quick to use and will provide consistent results to support risk management decisions. The model contains 63 questions that define the potential for entry and exposure by nine different pathways. The magnitude of the consequences is defined by 23 statements. The weight of different pathways is defined according to the properties of the assessed disease. The model was built as an Excel spreadsheet and is intended for use by animal health control administrators. As an outcome, the model gives the possible pathways of disease entry into the country, an overall approximation for the probability of entry and the subsequent exposure, an overall estimate for the consequences and a combined overall risk estimate (probability multiplied by magnitude of consequences). Model validity was assessed by expert panels. Outside Africa, African swine fever is currently established in Russia and Sardinia. In addition, there have been cases in both wild boar and domestic pigs in Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Estonia. Finland has frequent contacts with Russia and Estonia, especially through passengers. The risk of African swine fever (ASF) introduction into Finland was tested with NORA for the situation in December 2015, when ASF was endemic in many parts of Russia, Africa and Sardinia and was present in Baltic countries and in Poland. African swine fever was assessed to have a high probability of entry into Finland, with high consequences and therefore a high overall risk.
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| INTRODUCTION
Risk assessment can be either quantitative or qualitative, with both types being equally valid (Dufour et al., 2011) . Risk assessment is a good method to aid risk managers, for example with questions of emerging risks. However, the downside is often the time requirement of the method. There is often a need for information "as soon as possible", but the scientific quantitative risk assessment procedure may take months or even years. Therefore, various qualitative or semiquantitative methods have been developed to address risk questions in a matter of days. According to Wilson and Crouch (2001) , risk can be defined as a combination of the probability of an adverse event occurring and the severity of the occurrence, giving: Risk = Probability 9 Severity.
Rapid risk assessments are normally used when there is a need for a rapid and rough estimate of a risk shortly after it emerges to allow urgent risk management actions. Compared to a thorough scientific risk assessment, rapid risk assessment tools are less reliable and less accurate. There is often a need for expert panels instead of scientific evidence. Rapid risk assessments can be complex and demanding due to the tight time schedule and limited information available in rapidly changing situations.
The questions relating to the risk are answered and added together to gain an overall value, which is then usually converted to a four-to nine-level verbal scale (Dufour et al., 2011; Moutou, Dufour, & Ivanov, 2001) . The EFSA scientific opinion on risk assessment terminology (EFSA, 2012) provides an overview of categories used for different levels of risk. Words used for categories vary and, e.g., Mur, Mart ınez-L opez, and S anchez-Vizca ıno (2012) used a sixlevel scale (negligible, very low, low, medium, high and very high) when assessing the risk of African swine fever introduction into the EU through transport-associated routes. Rapid risk assessment tools are normally based on a flow chart (Morgan, Kirkbride, Hewitt, Said, & Walsh, 2009; Palmer, Brown, & Morgan, 2005) or a risk matrix (ECDC, 2011) . A flow chart is a structured way to attain an end point by answering a series of linked questions, while a matrix is a way of combining two categorized qualitative estimates (e.g., probability and consequence). Defra's International Disease Monitoring Veterinary Science Team has developed a tool to give a rapid semiquantitative measure of the risk of disease introduction (Roberts, Carbon, Hartley, & Sabirovic, 2011) . It uses a decision matrix based on the hypothesis that a disease could be introduced into the UK through trade (legal and illegal) in live animals or animal products, via transport and fomites or through the movement of vectors or wildlife. Morgan et al. (2009) developed a rapid, systematic, objective and transparent method for assessing the risk to the UK population from new and emerging infections arising anywhere in the world. They assumed the method to provide a means of communicating risk in a systematic manner to stakeholders and to provide an audit trail for the decisions made. The method was based on two flow charts, one for the probability and one for the impact of the risk. They published both the probability and impact of Chikungunya as being minimal when assessed with their tool. However, their tool did not combine the probability and impact.
The evaluation of risk assessment based on systematic documentation provides an important means of identifying where improvements can be made, as well as an evidence base for future risk assessments and responses to events (WHO, 2012) . According to WHO (2012) , rapid risk management of acute public health events reduces or prevents disease in affected populations and reduces negative social and economic consequences. Additional benefits are defensible decision-making, the implementation of appropriate and timely control measures, more effective operational communication, more effective risk communication and improved preparedness.
The reason for us to develop a specific tool for Finland is based on the special nature of our country: the risks are different from those in the majority of other EU countries. We are free from many common diseases, our country is isolated in many ways, the trade in animals is minimal, and native data are readily available.
African swine fever (ASF) is endemic in sub-Saharan Africa, or quantitative models .
Our aim was to develop a rapid, systematic and transparent risk assessment method to assess the risk of animal diseases spreading into Finland and to use it for ASF assessment, as the disease has spread alarmingly in Russia and in the Baltic countries.
| MATERIALS AND METHODS
NORA was built as an Excel spreadsheet, and its use does not require advanced computer skills. The method used is principally based on the risk assessment method developed by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) (2011). This method runs through three different steps: (i) release and exposure, (ii) consequences and (iii) overall risk estimation. The first step, release and exposure assessment, is an estimation of the likelihood of a hazard being introduced into Finland and a susceptible animal becoming exposed to the hazard. This can be referred to as the probability of occurrence. Secondly, consequences are assessed, including economic and health consequences. The third step is risk estimation, which combines the results of the two preceding steps.
| Identification of relevant pathways
Nine different pathways have been identified for the entry and release of a disease: with live animals (i), sperm and embryos (ii), products of animal origin (iii), passengers (iv), wildlife (v), air currents and/or vectors (vi), animal transport vehicles (vii), feed and bedding materials (viii) and other goods and traffic (ix) (Figure 1 ).
There are two sets of questions for each pathway. Every question comes with guidance on things to consider when answering.
Also, many multiple choice answers come with definitions of choices.
The first set of questions defines the possibility of a pathway for the scenario in question (Table 1) . If the pathway is relevant, the other set of questions defines the probability of that pathway in the scenario (Table 2) . If the pathway is not relevant, one moves on to the questions of the following pathway. These pathways are only relevant if the entry of the disease can be followed by the exposure of a susceptible animal.
| Probabilities of pathways
The probability of a pathway is a product of the questions defining The multiplied scores of entities are added together and divided by the number of entities. An example of an entity is the import of live animals, and another is the smuggling of live animals in the pathway "with live animals".
| Combining the probabilities of the pathways
NORA includes different weights for entry pathways (Table 3) and for the subfactors of consequences (Table 5 ). Different pathogens transmit in different ways; e.g., some pathogens can spread only through direct contact and some may spread with, e.g., air current and vectors. Therefore, the entry pathways need to be weighted depending on the transmission properties of the pathogen. There are three different weighting alternatives in NORA depending on the transmission of the disease. One is for easily transmitted viral diseases that can also be transmitted via animal products (African swine fever and classical swine fever), one is for easily transmitted viral diseases with an airborne transmission feature (Bluetongue), and one is for diseases with both properties (foot-and-mouth disease). The weighting factors were assigned as follows: firstly, the nine different pathways were ranked so that the pathways with the same significance were given the same rank. Then, 100 points were divided between the pathways according to their ranks. The probabilities of different pathways are added together and then divided by the total weights for the pathways (i.e., 100).
| Defining the consequences of a disease
The list of statements for the consequences of a hazard (Table 4) follows the questions for the pathways of entry. These are yes/no The weighting factors for the consequences are the same for all the assessed diseases (Table 5 ). The highest factor is for the impact on the T A B L E 1 Questions defining whether a pathway is relevant
With live animals
Is it possible for the disease to spread with live animals?
Is there import of live animals from the country(ies) in question?
Is it possible for these imported animals to come into contact with susceptible animals?
With sperm and embryos
Is it possible for the disease to spread with gametes?
Is there import of gametes from the country(ies) in question?
Is it possible for these imported gametes to end up in contact with susceptible animals?
3. With products of animal origin Is it possible for the disease to spread with products of animal origin?
Is there import of products of animal origin that may spread the disease from the country(ies) in question?
Is it possible for farmers or farm workers to bring these products with them?
Is it possible for the pathogen in these products to be carried with people to susceptible animals in Finland?
With passengers
Is it possible for the disease to be spread with humans?
Is it possible for a traveller in the country(ies) in question to have been in contact with infected animals or materials?
Is it possible for a person who has been in an animal facility in the country(ies) in question to come into contact with susceptible animals in Finland?
Is it possible for this person to enter an animal facility in Finland within the infectious period? Are other goods or land traffic coming from the country(ies) in question?
Is it possible for these goods or traffic to come into contact with susceptible animals in Finland while infectious? export of foodstuffs, the second highest is for the classification in the legislation, the third is for other multiplier effects, the fourth is for the menace and zoonotic features of the disease with identical weights, and the smallest factor is for the economic value of the animal sector(s) affected. These weighting factors rely on the fact that NORA is constructed for use in the administration of animal health control.
The consequences of the hazard are counted accordingly: the summed animal sector values are multiplied by the first three multiplier effects and added to the last multiplier effect ("the disease-free status is lost and its restoration demands significant resources") and to the disease classification in the legislation, menace and the possible zoonotic nature of the disease.
T A B L E 2 Questions defining the probability of a pathway
With live animals
How many batches of animals have been imported during the past year from the country(ies) in question?
Has there been import of animals from the area known to be infected during the past year?
Is the health status of the importing farm(s) known and acceptable?
Is the health status of the imported animals known and acceptable?
Is adequate import quarantine in use?
Is it possible that the smuggling of live animals from the country(ies) in question is significant?
Is it known that a significant number of sensitive animals have been imported against the rules from the country(ies) in question?
With gametes
How many batches of gametes have been imported from the country(ies) in question during the past year?
Has there been import of gametes from the area known to be infected during the past year?
Is the health status of the imported gametes known and acceptable?
Is it possible that the smuggling of gametes from the country(ies) in question is significant?
Is it known that a significant quantity of gametes has been imported against the rules from the country(ies) in question?
With products of animal origin
Is it possible that products of animal origin from the infected areas are brought for sale in Finland?
How large a quantity of products of animal origin from the country(ies) in question is sold in Finland?
How many of these products remain infective until in possession of the end user?
How many passengers come from the country(ies) in question?
How many citizens of the country(ies) in question work on Finnish farms?
Is it possible that the smuggling of products of animal origin from the country(ies) in question is significant?
Is it known that a significant quantity of products of animal origin has been imported against the rules from the country(ies) in question? How large a quantity of infectious other goods or traffic has come to Finland during the past year?
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| Combining probability and consequences
The estimate for probability is multiplied by the estimate for the consequences to calculate the total risk score. The probability and magnitude of the consequences and the total scores can then be transformed into a five-level categorical scale: negligible, low, moderate, high or very high risk (Tables 6, 7 and 8). The verbal scores are explained in Table 9 .
The equation for the combined overall risk:
| Validation of the tool
We first conducted a preliminary review of rapid risk assessment tools in May 2012, followed by a questionnaire to the five experts in charge of animal health issues at the Finnish Food Safety Authority Evira and two experts in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.
The replies to the questionnaire were discussed in a meeting in Table 1 ) and their probabilities (Probabilities of pathways, Table 2 ). Weights of pathways (Table 3) , weights for different consequence factors (Table 5 ) and the answers regarding the list of statements for the consequences of a disease (Table 4) were given by the research group and not changed by the validation groups. The results for overall pathways probabilities are presented separately for each validation group and also as a mean across all the validation groups.
3 | RESULTS
| Probability of the risk
The outcomes of the validation groups were mostly consistent: all groups (but not all individuals) assessed all the routes of entry and exposure to be relevant, except for air currents and/or vectors (Figure 1) . Moreover, they evaluated the probability of African swine fever being released into the Finnish pig population to be high ( being high (0.195) (Figure 2 , Table 6 ). To study the differences between the groups, we examined the mean ranks of probabilities with the Kruskal-Wallis test, because the estimates within the groups were not normally distributed and the numbers of respondents per group were low. The Kruskal-Wallis test revealed no significant difference (p = .309) between the mean ranks of probabilities for these groups (Figure 2 ).
Even though the mean overall probability estimate was quite similar across the four groups of respondents, the scores for the nine different pathways varied somewhat (Figure 3) . The mean overall scores (probability 9 weight) across the validation groups were as follows: the highest score was 6.7 for products of animal origin, 3.6
for live animals and for passengers, 1.8 for feed and bedding materials, 1.2 for other goods and traffic, 1.1 for sperm and embryos and for animal transport vehicles, and the lowest score 0.45 for wild boar.
To study the within-group variation in probabilities between the groups, we examined the mean ranks of residuals with the Kruskal- To determine how many respondents are needed to derive a solid estimate and as little variation as possible, we simulated the mean and 95% confidence interval for the 31 respondents in four groups of respondents with a Monte Carlo simulation model (Figure 4) . The specialists' estimates varied the least, and those of the plant health and food safety risk assessors varied the most. Therefore, the number of respondents needed to provide a solid estimate strongly depends on the background of the respondent.
| Consequences of the risk
The consequences of ASF release into Finland (Table 5) were evaluated by the research group to be 17.36 representing a high impact on the verbal scale (Table 7) . We did not evaluate the consequences in the validation groups, as the consequence claims are straightforward and do not include personal opinions.
To test the consistency of the tool, four diseases were tested with NORA for their consequences: Schmallenberg virus,
T A B L E 4 List of statements for consequences
Score for each option
Value of the animal sector as a foodstuff
The disease can spread to cattle 69.69
The disease can spread to horses 0.08
The disease can spread to poultry 12.99
The disease can spread to pigs 10.06
The disease can spread to cultivated fish 2.83
The disease can spread to deer 2.62
The disease can spread to reindeer 0.63
The disease can spread to wild fish 0.46
The disease can spread to hares 0.40
The disease can spread to sheep 0.15
The disease can spread to wild fowl 0.08
Disease classification in the legislation

Dangerous animal disease 24
Easily transmissible animal disease 32
Controlled animal disease 16
Notifiable animal disease 8
A new disease or form of the disease not mentioned in the legislation 20
Other animal disease 0 3. There are significant multiplier effects for the entry of the disease
Significant impact on the export of foodstuffs 50
The disease-free status is lost and the import of foodstuffs causes additional competition and significantly endangers domestic production
10
The disease-free status is lost and it raises the overall disease risk 10
The disease-free status is lost and its restoration demands significant resources Multiplier effect of exposure 1 (export) 100 50 9 100 = 5,000 5,000
Multiplier effects of exposure 2, 3, 4 50 50 9 50 = 2,500 2,500
Menace of the disease 11 0 1,100
Zoonotic feature of the disease 11 0 1,100 , 2015) . Schmallenberg, being a disease not controlled by the authorities, was considered to have zero consequences (multiplier effects, disease classification, menace and the zoonotic nature of the disease all giving a score of zero), and the financial losses for the society were assumed to be close to zero euros. However, Schmallenberg as a disease causes losses and social impacts to the producers that may lead to indirect financial losses for the society. Those consequences are not considered in NORA, as it is designed for assessing the risks of concern to the government.
| Overall risk
The probability of ASF introduction into Finland was assessed as high (0.196), the consequences were assessed as high (17. We tested the method by applying four groups with different areas of expertise who tested the NORA tool with ASF as the assessed disease. The mean ranks for the overall probability of ASF entry did not differ between the groups. Thus, the method appears to give consistent results. However, the members of the research group are aware of the subjectivity involved in the method.
The results from the expert groups were compared. only about 1,500-2,000 animals (Ohto Salo, Finnish Wildlife Agency).
F I G U R E 2
Overall probabilities for the entry of African swine fever estimated by the four validation groups (specialists, n = 5; experts, n = 5; postgraduates, n = 9; and risk assessors, n = 12). The interquartile range is the difference between the 75th and 25th percentiles and corresponds to the length of the box. The lines in the boxes represent the medians, the whiskers represent the minimum and maximum, unless there are values more than 1.5 times the interquartile range above 75th percentile, in which case it is the third quartile plus 1.5 times the interquartile range. Circles represent outliers that are >2 box lengths above the 75th percentile F I G U R E 3 Mean scores of entry of African swine fever estimated by the four validation groups for the nine pathways: with animals (1), sperm and embryos (2), products of animal origin (3), passengers (4), wildlife (5), air streams and/or vectors (6), animal transport vehicles (7), feed and bedding materials (8) the Russian side of the border is also low (Oravainen et al. 2011 ).
According to the study of Costard et al. (2013) the herd size was used to assess the biosecurity level of farms. At that time Finland still had quite small herds, which despite their small size had high biosecurity standards (Sahlstr€ om, Virtanen, Kyyr€ o, & Lyytik€ ainen, 2014) . Even though low proxys (2/5), these may have led to Finland having a too high risk score. Costard et al. (2013) stated that the lack of detailed national data on both wild boar and non-high-biosecurity farms makes estimation of areas of interface between F I G U R E 4 Effect of the number and background of experts on the simulated width of the 95% confidence interval of the mean value for the overall probability estimate of entry of African swine fever.
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
The association between the consequence scores for Schmallenberg (0), Bluetongue (6.54), ASF (17.36) and FMD (100) and the costs (€0, €4.7 M, €10.5 M and €27.7 M, respectively) for an outbreak of a typical size in Finland non-high-biosecurity farms and wild boar difficult, and is an important limitation of their study.
De la assessed the risk of African swine fever introduction into the EU by wild boar and updated the assessment in 2016 (Bosch et al., 2016 should be a high priority and that they had a relatively small set of input data. Indeed, Russia was given only one figure for density of domestic pig notifications (of ASF), and being such a large country, it
should have been assessed in smaller areas, because those outbreaks are happening mostly in the southern parts of the country and in the Tver area. Also, the distance to the nearest wild boar and domestic pig notifications (for ASF) were given as 114.14 km and 128.03 km for Finland, respectively. Those distances must be from Estonian outbreaks; however, the Baltic Sea hinders the spread of the disease between these countries with wild boar.
Unlike the methods of, i.e., ECDC (2011) considers both release and exposure so the overall risk level should be lower than when only the release risk is considered. However, a slight discrepancy can be observed between the results of these two assessments. NORA considers the wild boar risk to be the least significant pathway for introduction to Finland, and Mur et al. (2014) considers that wild boar release risk to Finland is in the highest category within the EU. Also the estimated risk of live pigs might reveal some discrepancy between studies. Mur et al. (2014) used EU databases and concluded that some of them were not as complete and detailed as the national databases and that this may have resulted in under-or overestimations of risk scores. Particularly, information on wild boar density and backyard pig production was limited and could have affected the model results. We think that the low number of wild boar in Finland, the absence of backyard pigs and the fact that Finland imports pigs from outside EU only from Norway, are actually facts that if not taken into consideration, may lead to false interpretations and introduce country-related bias into the relative risk estimates of pathways in EU.
Finland was given a very high (5/5) relative risk for ASFV introduction into the EU by waste from international ships and medium risk (2/5) for waste from international flights. The latter was described in the earlier risk profile we conducted, along with waste from the international railways (Oravainen et al., 2011 Even though national data were available to us for many pathways, some pathways needed to be answered without detailed infor- The consequences are assessed with yes/no questions that are unaffected by opinions. Therefore, the consequence section of the tool was not assessed by the validation groups. The association of the scores for consequences of the four diseases assessed and the predicted costs of the disease outbreaks were almost linear, which indicates that the scores closely approximate the importance of the disease event. This approach of not using the experts in consequence assessment is different from, for instance, Dufour et al. (2011) . They had scores between zero and three assigned for the three items considered for animal health and three for human health.
Their four-level scale is a subject for expert assessments.
Estimates for probability, consequences and overall risks in NORA are obtained both in numbers and as verbal scores. This can be an asset: some people merely like to see numbers, while others need to have a verbal score to feel comfortable with the answers. person might be a level that requires immediate intervention according to another. Therefore, definitions of the verbal scores for probability and impact are included in NORA.
Uncertainty is not built into the NORA framework. It is possible to estimate it by doing a combination of several point wise estimations, as was carried out when validating the tool in this study. However, by adding a Monte Carlo simulation option into NORA, it would be possible to include uncertainty in a more coherent way.
For the practical use of NORA, namely rapid risk assessment, simulation is rarely required.
NORA is a semiquantitative tool, and thus, also the interpretation of the results needs to be both verbal and numerical. Although there are qualitative verbal definitions, the location within the numerical class should be taken into account. The estimated risk might be close to a limit between two classes and is therefore relatively sensitive to small changes in input values.
The weights for different disease transmission routes and subfactors of consequences were assigned by the research group. Weights for the nine different pathways were ranked so that the pathways with the same significance were given the same rank. One hundred points were divided between the pathways according to their ranks. This is a fairly subjective and robust method, even though based on published literature. Therefore, when assessing a new disease, these weights should be assessed with the help of disease-specific experts.
The weighting for the subfactors for consequences was assigned by giving FMD the highest score (100) and then scaling down the other three diseases (BT, ASF and Schmallenberg) to correspond to the estimated mean expenses of the disease epidemic. Therefore, weights for consequence factors are related to the financial losses of the epidemics and are not as subjective as weights for pathways.
NORA is a rapid tool to use, which makes it easy to run it again whenever new information becomes available on a changing situation concerning disease spread. However, using experts in animal health risk assessments in Finland can be problematic, because the number and availability of experts is low. The results demonstrate that depending on the experts used, a few well-picked experts are sufficient to obtain a reasonable result. A small meeting or a summary with an update on the disease status and the situation at hand may be enough before the assessment. For example, in the case of new evidence of illegal imports of pigs or pork from the infected areas, updating the assessment with NORA would be useful.
We will continue using NORA also for other diseases and scenarios. Each disease needs to be validated within the research group and a group of disease-specific experts. ASF can act as a benchmark and form a basis on which to derive probabilities of entry and exposure for other diseases.
